Abstract

This article examines the early production of technical expert evidence in patent disputes, particularly in cases involving Standard Essential Patents (SEPs). Gabriel Di Blasi argues that the early taking of expert evidence is a legitimate procedural mechanism capable of enhancing judicial efficiency by enabling courts to understand complex technical matters before deciding urgent measures. In ordinary patent disputes, early expert evidence may promptly verify potential infringement and support the granting of injunctive relief.

However, the article emphasizes that this rationale cannot be automatically extended to SEP disputes, since SEPs are incorporated into indispensable technological standards for which no viable technical alternatives may exist. In such cases, preventing the use of the technology may effectively exclude entire companies from the market. Accordingly, early expert evidence should operate as a “technical filter,” assessing not only infringement, but also the essentiality of the patent, the parties’ conduct during FRAND negotiations, and the competitive impacts of the requested relief.

Based on international precedents and the Brazilian Code of Civil Procedure, the article argues that decisions in SEP litigation must observe proportionality, good faith, and public interest, avoiding automatic injunctions and prioritizing technically grounded and economically balanced solutions.

Keywords

Standard Essential Patents (SEPs), Early Expert Evidence, FRAND Licensing, Injunctive Relief, Competitive Proportionality.

Artigo

The early production of expert evidence in patent infringement actions is a legitimate and potentially valuable procedural mechanism. In a system where technology disputes depend upon specialized technical evidence, courts should neither be compelled to decide in the dark nor required to wait years for expert evidence, often determinative, to be produced only at the end of a rigid procedural sequence. Active judicial management of evidence, when conducted in accordance with due process, adversarial proceedings, predictability, and the parties’ technical participation, may reduce informational asymmetries, improve the assessment of likelihood of success, and render judicial protection more efficient.

The issue arises when a premise that may be appropriate in many ordinary patent disputes is transposed without qualification to disputes involving Standard Essential Patents (SEPs). In such cases, the early production of technical evidence may indeed benefit both parties by clarifying issues relating to claim mapping, essentiality, and standard implementation, thereby reducing technical uncertainties that frequently affect both preliminary injunction analysis and FRAND negotiations themselves. In this context, the decisive question is not whether expert evidence may be produced in advance, since Article 139(VI) of the Brazilian Code of Civil Procedure already authorizes courts to adapt the order of evidentiary production. The central issue is different: does early technical evidence serve the same function in disputes concerning ordinary patents and in disputes concerning patents whose alleged essentiality may condition access to an entire technological standard?

Brazilian civil procedure provides sufficient statutory basis for procedural adaptation. Article 139 (VI) authorizes courts to alter the order of evidentiary production according to the needs of the dispute. Articles 381 to 383 govern the anticipatory production of evidence, although it is important to distinguish such autonomous proceedings from the mere prioritization of the expert phase within a pending infringement action. Article 464, particularly Sections 2 and 3, authorizes simplified technical evidence where the disputed issue is less complex or may be clarified by a specialist. Articles 497 to 501 structure the framework for specific performance and injunctive relief, with Article 497, rather than Article 499 in isolation, constituting the central provision governing mandatory relief, prohibitory injunctions, and injunctive remedies.

In ordinary patent disputes, this framework may function adequately. If the controversy concerns the comparison between an accused product or process and the patent claims allegedly infringed, early expert evidence may rapidly clarify whether technical correspondence exists between the claimed elements and the implemented solution. Rather than deciding preliminary relief solely based on party-appointed expert opinions, courts may appoint an independent expert, establish a procedural timetable, receive technical questions, allow technical assistants, and thereafter determine with greater certainty whether injunctive relief is appropriate. In this scenario, early evidence may serve as an instrument of efficiency and balance: accelerating technical clarification without necessarily compromising adversarial proceedings.

That rationale, however, cannot be automatically transferred to SEP disputes. Ordinary patents generally coexist with the possibility of design-around alternatives. If a patent protects a specific battery cooling architecture, a particular camera stabilization mechanism, or a defined industrial configuration, competitors may seek alternative technical solutions. The exclusionary right attaches to the claimed invention but does not necessarily prevent economic agents from competing through different technological pathways, provided the protected technology is not reproduced.

SEPs operate differently. If the patent is truly essential to a standard, the implementer may lack any realistic technical alternative within that standard. The implementer’s choice is no longer between adopting the patented technology or pursuing an alternative solution, because no viable design-around exists within the same standard. The real alternative becomes either licensing the technology or remaining outside the market. Essentiality therefore alters the economic nature of the dispute. The patent ceases to be merely an exclusionary asset and instead assumes a position of control over a technical interoperability infrastructure.

Brazil’s Administrative Council for Economic Defense (CADE) situates SEPs precisely at this intersection between patents and technological standards, recognizing that standards themselves enable efficient communication among products from different manufacturers, reduce production costs, accelerate the adoption of new technologies, and facilitate market entry for companies developing products based on common technological platforms. It is precisely because standards perform this structural role that ownership of an SEP grants its holder a distinct bargaining position compared to holders of non-standardized patents. All entities implementing the standard will require a license, regardless of any alternative technical choice.

This structural distinction directly affects the appropriate procedural remedy. Brazil’s Industrial Property Law (Law No. 9,279/96) grants patentees the right to prevent unauthorized exploitation of patented inventions and authorizes preliminary injunctions to restrain infringement or acts giving rise thereto. In the SEP context, however, the exercise of such rights must be interpreted together with the FRAND commitment. SEP holders ordinarily undertake, before standard-setting organizations, to license their technology on fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory terms. The World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) describes FRAND licensing as a mechanism intended to balance the patent holder’s interest in recovering research and development investments against implementers’ access to standardized technologies, thereby promoting competition and innovation in standard-dependent industries.

Gabriel Di Blasi is Founding Partner of Di Blasi, Parente & Associados and President of ABAPI – the Brazilian Association of Intellectual Property Agents.

Notes:

¹ Código de Processo Civil, Lei nº 13.105/2015, arts. 139, VI; 300; 381 a 383; 464, §§ 2º, 3º e 4º; 497 a 501; e 1.019, I. Sobre o art. 139, VI, a fonte oficial indexada registra a possibilidade de dilatar prazos e alterar a ordem de produção da prova; sobre os arts. 497 a 501, a transcrição legislativa destaca a tutela específica e a conversão em perdas e danos. (Planalto)

² Conselho Administrativo de Defesa Econômica, “Contribuições do Cade: Patentes Essenciais”, Departamento de Estudos Econômicos. O estudo descreve a interdependência entre patentes e padrões, a relevância da interoperabilidade e a posição negocial diferenciada do titular de SEP. (Cade)

³ Lei nº 9.279/1996, arts. 42, 44 e 209, §1º. A fonte oficial indexada registra o direito do titular de impedir terceiros de produzir, usar, colocar à venda, vender ou importar produto patenteado sem consentimento, e o art. 209, §1º, permite sustação liminar da violação ou de ato que a enseje. (Planalto)

⁴ Organização Mundial da Propriedade Intelectual, “Standard Essential Patents”. A OMPI registra que o licenciamento FRAND busca equilibrar o interesse do titular em recuperar investimentos e o acesso dos implementadores às tecnologias padronizadas, promovendo concorrência e inovação. (WIPO)

⁵ ETSI IPR Policy, Annex 6. A política declara o objetivo de reduzir o risco de indisponibilidade de Essential IPRs e de equilibrar padronização para uso público com direitos de titulares de IPRs, além de prever compromisso irrevogável de licenciamento em termos FRAND. (ETSI)

⁶ A OMPI reconhece que negociações de SEP frequentemente envolvem múltiplas patentes em múltiplos países e que patent pools podem reunir titulares para licenciamento padronizado. A WIPO Strategy on Standard Essential Patents 2024–2026 destaca que o titular de uma SEP pode utilizar a ameaça de injunção para extrair termos supra-FRAND. fenômeno identificado como hold-up. e que o royalty stacking surge quando múltiplos titulares cobram cumulativamente pelo mesmo padrão, podendo tornar o conjunto de royalties excessivo. O mesmo documento aponta a ausência de consenso internacional sobre a determinação de termos FRAND e a inadequação de tratar SEPs sob o mesmo regime aplicável a patentes ordinárias. A assimetria informacional entre titulares e implementadores é examinada no estudo do Comitê Permanente sobre Patentes da OMPI (SCP). (WIPO, Standard Essential Patents, disponível em: https://www.wipo.int/en/web/patents/topics/sep; WIPO, Strategy on Standard Essential Patents 2024–2026, disponível em: https://www.wipo.int/edocs/pubdocs/en/wipo-pub-rn2024-12-en-strategy-on-standard-essential-patents-2024-2026.pdf; WIPO/SCP, Transparency and Standard Essential Patents, disponível em: https://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/scp/en/wipo_is_ip_ge_18/wipo_is_ip_ge_18_a_study.pdf)